Passive Safety System Reliability: Difference between revisions
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==Purpose== | ==Purpose== | ||
Passive Safety Systems will play a crucial role in the mitigation of risk for many different | Passive Safety Systems will play a crucial role in the mitigation of risk for many different advanced reactor designs. Advanced reactor designs may rely more heavily on Passive Safety Systems than the current fleet of LWRs which is why this area of research is deemed a high priority. | ||
==Scope== | ==Scope== | ||
Not only is it important to understand how passive safety systems operate, but also how different factors (both internal and external) can influence the actuation of the safety system and how to determine the associated uncertainty. Uncertainty will be a major focus in this topic, as it is likely that passive safety systems designed for | Not only is it important to understand how passive safety systems operate, but also how different factors (both internal and external) can influence the actuation of the safety system and how to determine the associated uncertainty. Uncertainty will be a major focus in this topic, as it is likely that passive safety systems designed for advanced reactors will have a larger range of uncertainty than those designed for the current fleet of LWRs. | ||
==Passive Safety Systems== | ==Passive Safety Systems== | ||
EPRI documents the initial research of passive safety system in 1015101 and 1016474, however more recent research can be found in references 33-36 on the | EPRI documents the initial research of passive safety system in [https://www.epri.com/research/products/000000000001015101 EPRI-1015101] [[References|[31]]] and [https://www.epri.com/research/products/000000000001016747 EPRI-1016474] [[References|[32]]], however more recent research can be found in references 33-36 on the [[References]] page. Since passive safety systems operate through natural phenomena, factors such as operating conditions, environmental conditions (seismic events, high winds, external flooding), corrosion, aging effects, and fouling of heat transfer surfaces can have a much larger impact on system reliability of a passive safety system compared to active safety systems. Since passive SSCs generally do not fail catastrophically but are more prone to gradual degradation over time implementation of effective monitoring and diagnostics to detect and address these mechanisms will be more important than they have been for the existing fleet of LWRs. | ||
Additionally, lack of data on some phenomena and missing operating experience need to be considered when analyzing the performance of passive systems. Natural circulation-based passive systems also have unique challenges due to the relatively low magnitude of the driving forces involved. | Additionally, lack of data on some phenomena and missing operating experience need to be considered when analyzing the performance of passive systems. Natural circulation-based passive systems also have unique challenges due to the relatively low magnitude of the driving forces involved. Review of reliability literature [[References|[37]]], [[References|[38]]], and [[References|[39]]] suggests that the technical methods can address the uncertainties associated with passive safety systems and existing methods can be categorized as: | ||
*reliability evaluation of passive safety systems | *[https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0029549303001055 reliability evaluation of passive safety systems] | ||
*reliability methods for passive safety functions | *[https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0029549305002347 reliability methods for passive safety functions] | ||
*analysis of passive systems reliability | *[https://www.hindawi.com/journals/stni/2008/573192/ analysis of passive systems reliability] | ||
Another challenge that has been considered is that the current methodology passive safety systems are viewed as a binary, success, or failure, where in reality passive safety systems can fail in intermediate conditions during operation. In order to overcome this the passive safety system reliability methodology will need to consider dynamic variations of independent process parameters, such as atmospheric temperature [40]. | Another challenge that has been considered is that the current methodology passive safety systems are viewed as a binary, success, or failure, where in reality passive safety systems can fail in intermediate conditions during operation. In order to overcome this, the passive safety system reliability methodology will need to consider dynamic variations of independent process parameters, such as atmospheric temperature [[References|[40]]]. | ||
The ultimate goal in the development of passive safety systems in ARs is to be able to define the uncertainty well enough that risk-informed decisions can be made and modeled with a high level of confidence. | The ultimate goal in the development of passive safety systems in ARs is to be able to define the uncertainty well enough that risk-informed decisions can be made and modeled with a high level of confidence. | ||
Roadmap actions supported for passive system reliability include: | Research Roadmap (EPRI [https://www.epri.com/research/products/000000003002026495 3002026495]) actions supported for passive system reliability include: | ||
*Develop and Qualify Analytical Tools for Advanced Reactor Designs | *Develop and Qualify Analytical Tools for Advanced Reactor Designs | ||
*Develop Enhancements to Licensing Process | *Develop Enhancements to Licensing Process | ||
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*Reduce Operating and Maintenance Costs to a Level Similar to Other Thermal Plants | *Reduce Operating and Maintenance Costs to a Level Similar to Other Thermal Plants | ||
A higher level of detail for these actions can be found in the | A higher level of detail for these actions can be found in the [https://www.epri.com/research/products/000000003002026495 report]. | ||
Latest revision as of 16:24, 10 July 2024
Purpose
Passive Safety Systems will play a crucial role in the mitigation of risk for many different advanced reactor designs. Advanced reactor designs may rely more heavily on Passive Safety Systems than the current fleet of LWRs which is why this area of research is deemed a high priority.
Scope
Not only is it important to understand how passive safety systems operate, but also how different factors (both internal and external) can influence the actuation of the safety system and how to determine the associated uncertainty. Uncertainty will be a major focus in this topic, as it is likely that passive safety systems designed for advanced reactors will have a larger range of uncertainty than those designed for the current fleet of LWRs.
Passive Safety Systems
EPRI documents the initial research of passive safety system in EPRI-1015101 [31] and EPRI-1016474 [32], however more recent research can be found in references 33-36 on the References page. Since passive safety systems operate through natural phenomena, factors such as operating conditions, environmental conditions (seismic events, high winds, external flooding), corrosion, aging effects, and fouling of heat transfer surfaces can have a much larger impact on system reliability of a passive safety system compared to active safety systems. Since passive SSCs generally do not fail catastrophically but are more prone to gradual degradation over time implementation of effective monitoring and diagnostics to detect and address these mechanisms will be more important than they have been for the existing fleet of LWRs.
Additionally, lack of data on some phenomena and missing operating experience need to be considered when analyzing the performance of passive systems. Natural circulation-based passive systems also have unique challenges due to the relatively low magnitude of the driving forces involved. Review of reliability literature [37], [38], and [39] suggests that the technical methods can address the uncertainties associated with passive safety systems and existing methods can be categorized as:
- reliability evaluation of passive safety systems
- reliability methods for passive safety functions
- analysis of passive systems reliability
Another challenge that has been considered is that the current methodology passive safety systems are viewed as a binary, success, or failure, where in reality passive safety systems can fail in intermediate conditions during operation. In order to overcome this, the passive safety system reliability methodology will need to consider dynamic variations of independent process parameters, such as atmospheric temperature [40].
The ultimate goal in the development of passive safety systems in ARs is to be able to define the uncertainty well enough that risk-informed decisions can be made and modeled with a high level of confidence.
Research Roadmap (EPRI 3002026495) actions supported for passive system reliability include:
- Develop and Qualify Analytical Tools for Advanced Reactor Designs
- Develop Enhancements to Licensing Process
- Demonstrate Risk-Informed and Performance Based Approach
- Reduce Operating and Maintenance Costs to a Level Similar to Other Thermal Plants
A higher level of detail for these actions can be found in the report.